AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION TRIBUNAL
In the matter of Fortescue Metals Group Limited [2010] ACompT 2
SUMMARY
FINKELSTEIN J (PRESIDENT),
MR GRANT LATTA AND
PROFESSOR DAVID ROUND
30 June 2010
MELBOURNE
SUMMARY
1 In matters of significant public interest, it is the practice of the Australian Competition Tribunal to prepare a summary to accompany its determination. This summary is intended to assist in understanding the Tribunal’s decision and is not a statement of its reasons. The only authoritative statement of the Tribunal’s reasons is that contained in its Reasons for Determination which will in due course be published.
1. THE APPLICATIONS
2 The Tribunal dealt with four applications under Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (the Act). Part IIIA is a regime which enables a third party to obtain access to services provided by “essential facilities”. These are facilities of national significance which are (1) uneconomic to duplicate (the cost of duplication can be hundreds of millions of dollars or more) and (2) provide services, access to which would promote competition.
3 The process for seeking access involves two stages. The first stage is to apply for the service to be “declared”. If the service is declared, the second stage involves the third party negotiating access terms with the owner. If no agreement is reached, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) can resolve any dispute by arbitration, subject to any appeal to the Tribunal.
4 These applications concern the declaration stage. Fortescue Metals Group Ltd (FMG) is a mining company operating in the Pilbara. It seeks to have declared services provided by four heavy haulage railways which are designed to transport iron ore:
· The Mt Newman line, operated by BHP Billiton Iron Ore Pty Ltd and BHP Billiton Minerals Pty Ltd (together, BHPB), which runs from the south-east Pilbara to Port Hedland;
· The Goldsworthy line, also operated by BHPB, which runs from the north-east Pilbara to Port Hedland;
· The Hamersley line, operated by Rio Tinto Iron Ore, a division of Rio Tinto Ltd (RTIO), which runs from the south-east and central Pilbara to the port at Dampier; and
· The Robe line, operated by RTIO, which runs from the western Pilbara to the port at Cape Lambert.
5 In each case the service applied for is the use of the railway track and associated infrastructure. This is often referred to as a “below rail” service. This may be contrasted with an “above rail” service (ie use of trains), for which access is not sought. Put simply, if access to the service is obtained a third party (such as FMG) would be able to run its own trains on the line to transport iron ore, but would not be able to require the owner to transport the third party’s iron ore.
6 FMG initially applied to the National Competition Council (NCC) to recommend to the relevant Minister that the services be declared. The NCC recommended that all the services be declared and, in due course, the designated Minister made declarations in relation to the Goldsworthy, Hamersley and Robe lines and was deemed not to have made a declaration in relation to the Mt Newman line.
7 Each of BHPB and RTIO applied to the Tribunal to review the decisions that went against them. FMG applied to review the deemed decision not to declare the Mt Newman service. For convenience, the reviews were heard together, but it should be emphasised that each application for review was considered separately.
8 During the hearings the parties put many arguments which raised complicated legal, economic and factual issues. The Tribunal heard evidence from expert economists, geologists, engineers, computer simulation experts, rail modellers, train schedulers, quantity surveyors, metallurgists, bankers and environmental scientists (to name a few). A number of senior executives from the mining companies also gave evidence. It is not possible here to give a comprehensive summary of the facts or the issues raised. This summary is only intended to give a sense of each party’s position, albeit in very broad terms.
9 FMG’s position is that rail is the only viable means of transporting iron ore for most junior miners in the Pilbara. Without access to rail, those miners are effectively stranded. Because rail is so capital-intensive, many miners cannot afford to build their own railways and, even for those that could, this would be wasteful. It would be far more efficient to share the existing lines, which either have ample capacity to handle additional volumes of iron ore, or could be expanded to handle that volume more cheaply than building substitute railways.
10 RTIO and BHPB argued that the way they use rail as part of an integrated mine-rail-port production system requires absolute flexibility and exclusive use of the line. Third parties accessing the line would interfere with that business model with disastrous consequences. Further, they said there was little point in declaring the services given that (1) for many smaller junior miners, rail transport will be too expensive and there are cheaper alternatives, like trucking; and (2) those for whom rail is viable could probably afford to build their own lines.
2. THE FACTS
11 There are several key findings of fact that significantly influenced the Tribunal’s decision about whether or not the services should be declared.
12 The Tribunal accepted that for many miners, rail may be the only viable, or at least the most cost effective, means of transporting iron ore. It is very capital-intensive to build a railway but, once built, it is likely to be a real option for many miners, even those with relatively small operations.
13 The Tribunal also accepted that both BHPB and RTIO place significant demand on their lines and require a great deal of flexibility in using them. They operate on what they refer to as a “run when ready” basis, rather than a scheduled basis, constantly adjusting their rail usage to respond to needs at mine and port. This kind of operation makes it potentially difficult for third parties to fit in with the owners’ modes of operation, particularly on sections of the lines where demand is intense.
14 The Tribunal also reached the conclusion that, except for the Goldsworthy service, if access is not granted to the services, new railways would be built which could be used by many of the junior miners that might otherwise seek access to the owners’ lines. A number of emerging junior miners in the Pilbara have publicly announced plans to build new mines, develop new ports and, importantly, construct new railways if there is no access to the lines of BHPB and RTIO. Indeed, FMG has already constructed its own railway line which runs roughly parallel to the Mt Newman line for a considerable distance and is planning to construct other lines.
15 That new lines could be built does not necessarily mean that it is efficient to build them. The evidence suggested that all the existing lines have the capacity to handle at least a small amount of additional third party iron ore. However, the level of potential third party demand for each service is substantial, and for some of the lines very substantial. This means that expansions are likely to be needed to accommodate the demand. For all lines except the Mt Newman line, the cost of expansion would be significantly less than the cost of constructing a new line.
3. THE LAW
16 To declare a service, the Tribunal must be satisfied of the criteria that are to be found in section 44H(2). Some were conceded by BHPB and RTIO. Only three remained in dispute.
3.1 Criterion (a)
17 The first criterion is whether access to the service would promote a material increase in competition in at least one market, other than the market for the service. FMG argued that, in the case of each service, access would promote a material increase in competition in three markets: a Pilbara tenements market, a rail haulage market and a seaborne iron ore market. The Tribunal found that for each of the services except the Mt Newman service, access would promote a material increase in competition in a rail haulage market, but not in the remaining markets.
3.2 Criterion (b)
18 The second criterion is whether it would be “uneconomical” for anyone to develop another rail facility to provide the service. FMG argued that this should be viewed from society’s perspective, such that uneconomical means “inefficient”. BHPB and RTIO argued that the criterion should be interpreted to mean whether it would be profitable for any one person to build another line. They pointed to FMG as such a person. The Tribunal considered that this criterion tests whether a facility has natural monopoly characteristics. The Tribunal then held that three lines (the Hamersley, Robe and Goldsworthy lines) are natural monopolies; but not the Mt Newman line, given the possibility of extending FMG’s existing line to cater for third party demand in the vicinity of that line.
3.3 Criterion (f) and discretion
19 The third criterion is whether access to the services is not contrary to the public interest. The Tribunal said that in assessing the public interest, it is necessary to weigh up the benefits and costs of access to society, going forward. There were certain key benefits from access which the Tribunal identified, which would occur to a greater or lesser extent for each service. Broadly, the key benefits were (1) savings from sharing the existing railways rather than duplicating them; and (2) making rail services available for some mining projects (bearing in mind that many would be able to access alternative railways in any event).
20 On the other hand, the Tribunal found that there are significant costs that would result from access. Where there was high demand for a line, there would be severe logistical and commercial constraints imposed on third parties to ensure there was no interference with the owners’ highly flexible business models. Access would also delay the owners’ future expansions plans or changes in operating practices or technology. This could result in billions of dollars of lost export revenues.
21 The extent to which access would produce these benefits and costs varied from line to line. The Tribunal held that the costs likely to be suffered from access to the Mt Newman or Hamersley services were so great that access would be contrary to the public interest. The Tribunal was satisfied that the benefits of access to the Goldsworthy service and the Robe service outweighed the costs so access would not be contrary to the public interest.
22 The different results were, in large part, a reflection of the intensity of use of the lines. The Mt Newman and Hamersley lines transport the bulk of BHPB’s and RTIO’s production of iron ore. The potential additional demand for those lines was significant. Apart from potentially posing major logistical challenges (and resultant costs) for third parties, it would also cause significant delays in any expansion projects or innovations which BHPB and RTIO wish to undertake. The Tribunal found that BHPB and RTIO would regularly need to expand the lines and introduce innovations in the years to come as they respond to the growing world demand for iron ore.
23 The resultant costs, both to the owners and the third parties, had the very real potential of dwarfing whatever benefits might exist from avoiding duplication of the lines. That is, while the cost of duplication is potentially large, the likely cost to BHPB and RTIO resulting from lost throughput and other inefficiencies flowing from line sharing are even greater.
24 By way of contrast, the Goldsworthy and Robe lines carry less ore for the owners and third party demand is far less. The Tribunal therefore decided that the likely cost of access will not outweigh the benefits.
4. Reasons
25 The Tribunal has provided to the parties Reasons for Determination. The reasons will be published once the parties have had an opportunity to consider whether any parts should be redacted for reasons of commercial confidentiality.